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Abstract 
Recently, Liu et al. (Quantum Inf Process (2014) 13:491–502) proposed an 
arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) scheme, where a signature receiver (Bob) can 
verify the signer’s signature through the help of a trusted arbitrator. However, this 
paper shows that a malicious Bob can perform the existential forgery of the signature 
under the chosen message attack without being detected.  
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1 Introduction 
Arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) is one of the imperative research topics in 
quantum cryptography which guarantees the authentication of identities and the 
integrity of the classical messages or quantum states over insecure quantum channels 
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[1-3]. Usually, in an AQS scheme, a trusted arbitrator helps a receiver to validate the 
legitimacy of the signature. Similar to the classical digital signature, an AQS should 
satisfy the following security requirements [3]:  
1. Unforgeability: Neither the signature receiver nor an attacker can forge a 
signature or change the content of a signature. 
2. Non-repudiation: After signing a valid signature, a signer should not be able to 
deny that.  
In 2001, Gottesman and Chuang [4] firstly brought out the idea of designing an 
AQS scheme based on fundamental principles of quantum physics. After that, various 
AQS schemes have been proposed [1-3, 5-19]. Recently, Liu et al. proposed an AQS 
scheme with fast signing and verifying technique [20], where a new quantum 
one-time pad (QOTP) called D-QOTP (QOTP using decoy states) is designed to avoid 
being forged and disavowed [18, 19]. However, in this paper, we show that a 
malicious receiver, Bob, can perform the existential forgery of the signature under the 
chosen message attack by using several valid quantum message and signature pairs 
without being detected. Therefore, the requirements of unforgeability and 
non-repudiation are not satisfied in Liu et al.’s AQS scheme.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Liu et al.'s AQS 
scheme. Section 3 describes the existential forgery in Liu et al.'s scheme. Section 4 
summarizes the result. 
2 Review of Liu et al.'s AQS Scheme 
In this section, at first we describe the technique of the D-QOTP (i.e., quantum 
one-time pad using decoy states) algorithm which used in Liu et al.’s AQS scheme. 
Subsequently, we briefly review of Liu et al.’s AQS scheme. 
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2.1 The D-QOTP Algorithm 
Suppose K  denotes the secret key shared between the sender and the receiver. The 
quantum message P  can be encrypted to C  as follows, where 
1
n
i i
P p , 
0 1
i i i
p    , ,i i  C , 
2 2
1
i i
   , and 1 i n  .  
Encryption Algorithm of D-QOTP 
E1. Split K  into 12 2t   substrings      2 22 1 2 1 2 2; , ;...;L L LQ K K K
             2 21 2 12 1 2 1 2 2 2 12 2 2 2 1
,..., . ; , ;...; ,...,t tt t t tRL R R RL RK K K K K K K   (more details 
please see [20]), where 
12 3t n   . 
E2. Every substrings 
 2 2i jL
K  and 
 2 2i jR
K  can be interpreted as decimal integers 
Lj
i  and Rji , respectively, where 1 i t   and 
11 2ij   . That is, 
  1 11 1 2 1 1 1 2 110 2 21 ;2 ,2 ;...; ,..., . 1 ;2 ,2 ;...; ,...,t tL L L L R R R RL RQ t t t t  . 
E3. R  is the quantum sequence in the states of the loop of  0 , 1 , ,  , i.e., 
 0 , 1 , , ; 0 , 1 , , ;...R      . 
E4.  KC E P , where the decoy state of R  is inserted into P  to form C  
based on  
10
Q . 
Finally, we can get the output  KC E P  from E1 to E4. 
Based on the cipher-text C  and the secret key K , the decryption algorithm is 
described as follows. 
Decryption Algorithm of D-QOTP 
D1. The same as Step E1, split K  into the string Q . 
D2. The same as Step E2 to obtain the decimal integer string  
10
Q . 
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D3. The same as Step E2 to construct R . 
D4. Extract the decoy states from C  based on  
10
Q , which is denoted as R  . 
Subsequently, measure R   with the bases which are indicated in R . Verify 
the measurement result to check the eavesdropping and the integrity of P . If 
there exists an eavesdropping, this session will be aborted and restarts the 
protocol again. 
Finally, we can decrypt C  to obtain  KP D C . 
2.2 A Brief Review of Liu et al.’s AQS scheme 
Here, a signer Alice wants to sign on the quantum message P  and transmits it to 
the signature receiver, Bob. Subsequently, Bob can verify Alice’s signature with the 
help of a trusted arbitrator, Trent. Liu et al.’s AQS scheme is composed of three 
phases: the initializing phase, the signing phase, and the verifying phase.  
Initializing phase 
Step I1. Trent shares the secret keys 
A
K  and 
B
K  with Alice and Bob, respectively, 
through the unconditionally secure quantum key distribution protocols, 
where  0,1 A
L
AK  ,  0,1
BL
BK  , 2
2
A
n
L
 
  
 
, and 2
2
A
B
n L
L
 
  
 
. 
Step I2. Alice, Bob, and Trent choose a loop sequence R  from  0 , 1 , ,   
as a set of the decoy states. 
 
Signing phase 
Step S1. Alice prepares the quantum message P , in which if P  is composed of 
5 
known quantum states, then arbitrary copies of P  can be produced. If 
P  is composed of unknown quantum states, then there need at least three 
copies of P , i.e. 
1
P , 
2
P , and 
3
P , where 
1 2 3
P P P  . 
Step S2. Follow Step E1, Alice obtains 
A
Q . 
Step S3. From Step E2, Alice obtains  
10A
Q . 
Step S4. Alice generates her quantum signature  3AKS E P  based on R  and 
 
10A
Q .  
Step S5. Alice sends 
1 2
S P P   to Bob.  
Verifying phase 
Step V1. Upon receiving the quantum sequence, Bob compares whether 
1 2
P P  
by using quantum fingerprinting [21]. If the comparison result is negative, 
then Bob aborts this transmission and informs Alice to restart the scheme. 
Otherwise, Bob splits 
B
K  into 
B
Q  and then obtains  
10B
Q  by using the 
same way in Step E1 and E2. 
Step V2. Bob transforms 
2
P  into  
2BK
T E P  by using R  and  
10B
Q . 
Step V3. Bob keeps 
1
P  and  
10B
Q , and then sends S T  to Trent. 
Step V4. Trent splits 
A
K  and 
B
K  into 
A
Q  and 
B
Q  to obtain  
10A
Q  and 
 
10B
Q , respectively, which is identical with Step D1~D3. Subsequently, 
Trent extracts the decoy states from S  and T  based on  
10A
Q  and 
 
10B
Q  to obtain 
3
P  and 
2
P , respectively. 
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Step V5. Following Step D4, Trent measures the extracted decoy states 
3
\S P  
and 
2
\T P  with the bases which are indicated in   10 ,AQ R  and 
  10 ,BQ R , respectively. In this case, Trent can check whether there exists an 
eavesdropper or not. Besides, Trent can also check existence of any forgery 
attack from the measurement results. Subsequently, Trent compares 
3
P  and 
2
P . If 
3 2
P P  , Trent aborts this communication and the scheme needs to 
be restarted. Otherwise, Trent continues to the next step.  
Step V6. Trent transforms 
2
P  to  2BKT E P  based on R  and  10BQ . 
After that, Trent transforms 
3
P  to   3B AK KTS E E P  based on 
  10 ,AQ R  and   10 ,BQ R . Trent sends TT S  to Bob. 
Step V7. Bob extracts and measures the decoy states from T  and 
T
S  based on 
  
10
,
B
Q R , respectively, and denotes the rest particles of T  and 
T
S  
as 
2
P  and S  . Bob verifies the measurement results, if there exists an 
eavesdropping, then Bob rejects the signature. Otherwise, Bob goes to the 
next step. 
Step V8. Bob compares 
2
P with his retained 
1
P . If 
2 1
P P  , then Bob 
accepts S  . Otherwise, Bob rejects S  . 
3 The Existential Forgery of Signature 
In this section, we demonstrate that a malicious receiver, Bob, is able to perform the 
existential forgery of signer’s signature without being detected as follows.  
7 
In their AQS scheme, Alice’s quantum signature S  is generated based on the 
loop sequence R  and the secret key AK . For singing the different quantum 
messages (i.e., 
A
P  and 
B
P , where 
A B
P P n  , and 
A B
P P ), Alice 
generates different quantum signatures (
A
S  and 
B
S ) based on the loop sequence 
R  and the secret key AK . However, because of the usage of the same secret key, 
the positions of the decoy states would always be the same in two different quantum 
signatures. A malicious receiver, Bob, may collect several quantum signatures in order 
to comprehend the positions of the quantum messages and the decoy states. Once the 
positions of the quantum message are revealed to n-bit length, Bob can modify the 
pair of the quantum message and the quantum signature together by using unitary 
operations without being detected. Therefore, their scheme cannot satisfy the 
requirements of unforgeability. 
 For example, suppose there are two quantum messages 0 0 0 0
A
P  , 
1 1 1 1
B
P  ,  4
A B
P P  , 1011K  , and  0 , 1 ,R   . We can 
divide K  and obtain             2 2 2 22 1 2 12 1 2 2 2 1 2 2; , . ; ,L RL L R RQ K K K K K K 
   10;1,0.11;1,1 10;1.11;1 , where the zero position is ignored and the exclusion 
principle is used in the last equation. Subsequently,    
10
2;1.3;1Q  . For the 
quantum messages 
A
P  and 
B
P , the resulting signatures are 
 1 2 3 41 , , 0 , , , , , 0A A A A AS p p p p     1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , , 0 , 0 , 0  
and   1 2 3 41 , , 0 , , , , , 0 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 , , 1 , 1 ,B B B B BS p p p p     
0 , respectively. Now, Bob compares 
i
A
S  and 
i
B
S  by using quantum 
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fingerprinting, where 1 8i  . Bob can obtain the comparison results of 
2 2
A B
S S , 
4 4
A B
S S , 
6 6
A B
S S , 
7 7
A B
S S .  Since the number of 
i i
A B
S S  is equal to 
the length of the quantum message (i.e., 4), therefore, Bob can perform any unitary 
operation on the new quantum message and the corresponding quantum signature in 
the positions  2,4,6,7  without being detected. Due to this attack, the signer, Alice, 
can later deny that she has signed a new quantum message. Therefore, Liu et al.’s 
AQS scheme cannot satisfy the requirements of the unforgeability as well as 
non-repudiation. 
4 Conclusions 
In this article, we have pointed out that Liu et al.’s AQS scheme suffers from the 
existential forgery of the signature under the chosen message attack performed by a 
signature receiver, Bob. The possible way to resolve this issue is that, the signer 
(Alice) has to share a new secret key with the arbitrator (Trent), which requires a 
QKD protocol to perform between them. However, this approach is not feasible for a 
signature scheme and that also impair the efficiency of the protocol. Therefore, how 
to design an AQS scheme with the feature of key re-usability would be an interesting 
research topic. 
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